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Abstract
While a landslide at the volcanic island of Stromboli (Aeolian Islands, Italy) in December 2002 created a tsunami
with a run-up of 10.9 m, two paroxysmal eruptions in the summer of 2019 caused a tsunami with an amplitude of
40 to 20 cm. All three events required rapid, spontaneous emergency evacuations of the beach zone as the time
between tsunami generation and impact is around 4 min. These conditions thus require a special consideration of
the issue of evacuation capabilities on the island in the event of a volcanogenic tsunami. The purpose of this paper
is thus to (i) determine pedestrian evacuation times from high-risk coastal areas to safe zones, (ii) to assess building
evacuation ease, and (iii) determine emergency evacuation plans (for buildings and coastal zones). For this purpose,
we created a GIS-based risk analysis/mapping tool that also allowed macroscopic evacuation modelling. In our case,
the high-risk zone to be evacuated involves an area extending to 10 m a.s.l. and involving 123 individual buildings
over an area of 0.18 km2. The results show that 33% of the buildings can be evacuated in 4 min, and that a 10-min
warning time is required for a complete and well-distributed evacuation whereby the population is evenly
distributed between all evacuation exits to avoid the potential for congestion. Initial interviews of residents in the
at-risk zone reveal a high level of awareness and a desire for personalized evacuation scenarios.
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Introduction
All international tsunami risk management bodies
agree that planning for evacuation drastically reduces
the risk and saves lives among coastal populations
(Scheer et al. 2011; FEMA 2019). Evacuation plans
allow for effective placement of signs indicating
danger zones, refuge sites, and evacuation routes
(Dall’Osso and Dominey-Howes 2010; FEMA 2019)
and can be used to support increased public
awareness, which will help to develop reflexes and
resilience of coastal populations (Gregg et al. 2006;
Kelman et al. 2008; Morin et al. 2008; Løvholt et al.
2019; Wood et al. 2019), improving the efficiency of
future evacuations (Péroche 2016). A number of stud-
ies have been carried out around the world to reduce
the impact of tsunamis on populations by increasing
the efficiency of evacuations through planning
(Lämmel et al. 2010; Sahal 2011; Leone et al. 2013,
2014, 2018; Péroche et al. 2014; Péroche 2016). What
all of these studies show is that an effective evacu-
ation has to be based on a viable plan that takes into
account the physical state of evacuation routes
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(widths of roads/paths, surface type, state of repair,
slope) and the speed at which the population in need
of evacuation can move from the danger zone to the
refuge site (cf. Leone et al. 2018).
Two types of evacuation can be considered: horizontal
evacuation, where exposed populations are moved out of
the danger zone, and vertical evacuation, where popula-
tions seek safety by gaining a high point within the
danger zone, which may include specially designed and
constructed towers, i.e., vertical evacuation shelters (e.g.,
Nakano 2010; Park et al. 2012; Ashar et al. 2014). In the
case of a horizontal evacuation, several modes of trans-
portation can be used: personal vehicle, public transport
and/or by foot (Péroche 2016). To implement either a
horizontal or vertical evacuation, the quickest most effi-
cient route between the point to be evacuated and the
security zone needs to be defined (cf. Forcael et al.
2014), as does the viability of that route for evacuation
(e.g., Hamacher and Tjandra 2001; Daamen and Hoo-
gendoorn 2010; Lämmel et al. 2010). There are two cat-
egories of models for simulating mass evacuation:
microscopic and macroscopic. Microscopic models (e.g.
multi-agent models) are used to simulate human behav-
iour and interactions between individuals essentially on
a local scale. These models are mainly used for evacu-
ation through individual doors, corridors or rooms, and
apply to single buildings, shopping malls or ships (e.g.,
Daamen and Hoogendoorn 2010; Jo et al. 2014; Wang
et al. 2014). In contrast, macroscopic models can be
used at a smaller spatial scale to obtain theoretical values
of evacuation time or capacity using graph theory for en-
tire cities or city blocks (Leone et al. 2013). The first step
of an evacuation planning approach based on macro-
scopic modelling is to collect as much information as
possible on the tsunami risk in the target area (Scheer
et al. 2011; FEMA 2019). Fundamental to this is a defin-
ition of the exposed area, i.e., the area likely to be
flooded by the tsunami and thus in need of evacuation,
and a safe “refuge” area (cf. Leone et al. 2018; Fig. 1).
Such scenarios can be based on past events that have
been recorded and whose run-up limits have been
mapped or hazard modelling (e.g., Tinti et al. 2006a;
Fig. 1 a Map of Stromboli with the location of Stromboli and Ginostra villages, the Sciara del Fuoco and the two sea floor tsunami sensors
located to the Northeast (NE) and Southwest (SW) of the Sciara del Fuoco. b Map of Stromboli zoomed on the zone impacted by 2002-tsunami.
Image data ©2019 Google Earth: SIO, NOAA, U. S. Navy, NGA, GEBCO
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Giachetti et al. 2012; Fraser et al. 2014; Paris et al. 2017).
A safety margin should be added between the area likely
to be flooded and the refuge area to guarantee the safety
of individuals in the event of extreme events (Péroche
2016), where Leone et al. (2018) in their EXPLOIT
method advise a safety margin of at least 5 m above the
maximum run-up recorded. Placement of such an error
margin is consistent with the findings of Smart et al.
(2016) who point out that initial waves can smooth the
micro-topography to increase the run ups of subsequent
waves. Then, through fieldwork, data has to be collected
on the number of people to be evacuated, the points
from which they need to be evacuated, the areas to
which they should be evacuated, and the characteristics
and qualities of the paths used for transit between each
evacuation point and refuge area (Weidmann et al. 2014;
Leone et al. 2018). Then, simulations are run to find the
quickest, most efficient, evacuation routes. We here de-
velop just such a method, based on the models of Pér-
oche (2016) and Leone et al. (2018), to assess best
horizontal pedestrian evacuation from a populated
shoreline in the event of a locally-induced volcanogenic
tsunami for which there is little response time.
We focus our study on the island of Stromboli
(Aeolian Islands, Italy) for three reasons. First, Stromboli
has been the site of several locally-triggered tsunamis
over the last 100 years, either triggered by landslides or
pyroclastic flows entering the sea (Maramai et al. 2005a;
Tinti et al. 2006a). The distance between the source of
the tsunami (at the foot of the Sciara del Fuoco) and the
shore-line population (between the villages of Piscità
and Scari) is just a few kilometres, so that tsunami travel
times to the exposed population is very short, being just
a few minutes (Tinti et al. 2006b). Second, a mixed
population of tourists and local residents populate the
shoreline in differing densities between summer and
winter. Each population will have differing levels of un-
derstanding, education and, hence, evacuation needs
(Johnston et al. 2016; Blake et al. 2018). Third, a warning
system is in place on Stromboli involving a siren system
triggered by a sea-floor pressure sensor (Bertolaso et al.
2009; Lacanna and Ripepe 2020). This warning system
has been coupled with installation of signage on the is-
land indicating “escape routes” between the zone to be
evacuated and refuge zones (Fig. 2). Note that in this
study we use “evacuation routes” rather than “escape
routes” to conform to the international standards estab-
lished in terms of tsunami evacuation (International
Tsunami Information Center 2021). However, events of
2019 when a paroxysmal explosion triggered a pyroclas-
tic flow that entered the sea to generate a tsunami
highlighted a need to update the evacuation plans and
produce maps showing optimum evacuation routes.
Fundamentally, a confused response was observed, with
some tourists actually jumping into the sea (Rai News
2019).1 Confused responses were also observed in
Greece and Turkey during the tsunami of 2017 (Løvholt
et al. 2019). Locally the objective of this work is thus: (i)
to determine pedestrian evacuation times from coastal
areas, (ii) to assess the ease with which one can evacuate
Fig. 2 Tsunami signage related to hazard zone, evacuation route and safe area (UNESCO standardised design). a Sign on Stromboli Island
designating the area as a Tsunami Hazard zone, but also indicating other important elements, including the expected behavioural response (i.e.,
to leave the coastal area immediately) “in case of” several sources of early alert (i.e., environmental cues/natural warnings and sirens sounding). b
“Escape route” direction arrows. c Signage with arrow indicating the direction to waiting areas
1Alcuni dei turisti per paura si sono lanciati in mare – Some of the
tourists out of fear jumped into the sea (following the 3 July
explosion).
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a building, (iii) to design emergency evacuation plans
(for buildings as well as open-space coastal zones) tai-
lored to the needs of permanent residents and visitors,
as well as hotel owners, vacation rentals, restaurants and
shops. Crucially, given estimated evacuation times, we
need to know the minimum alert time to allow all at-
risk areas to be evacuated before wave arrival. In doing
this, we define a Geographical Information System (GIS)
based methodology to generate both large scale and
individual building evacuation plans for any similar
scenario.
Setting
The island of Stromboli is the emerged part of a large
submarine volcano that began building 100 ka (Hornig-
Kjarsgaard et al. 1993). The summit of the island reaches
924 m above sea level (a.s.l.), while the submarine base
of the volcano is at a depth of 2000m below sea level
(b.s.l.) (Hornig-Kjarsgaard et al. 1993; Pasquarè et al.
1993). The morphology of Stromboli volcano has
evolved over time during nine cycles of activity, each as-
sociated with flank collapse. The last major collapse was
5 ka and is the origin of the Sciara del Fuoco (Hornig-
Kjarsgaard et al. 1993; Pasquarè et al. 1993; Tibaldi
2001; Corazzato et al. 2008; Fig. 1). Current hazards at
Stromboli can be grouped into five main classes (Barberi
et al. 1993), those associated with: (i) normal explosive
activity, (ii) major explosions, (iii) paroxysmal crises
feeding ash plumes to !4 km and pyroclastic density cur-
rents (PDCs) to the sea, (iv) lava flows and (v) subaerial
and submarine landslides. Hazard classes (iii) and (v) are
associated with tsunamis, as arrival of large volumes of
material (either as a PDC or landslide) into the sea pro-
duces a mass displacement of the water to produce tsu-
namis with run ups of up to 10.9 m (Tinti et al. 2006a).
Tsunami worst-case scenarios at Stromboli envisage a
total collapse of the Sciara del Fuoco, just as when it was
formed 5 ka (Kokelaar and Romagnoli 1995; Tinti et al.
2000). The 5-ka collapse involved a volume of material
of between 0.97 and 1.81 km3 (Kokelaar and Romagnoli
1995), and the resulting tsunami would have had a run-
up of up to 50 m (Tinti et al. 2000). Another scenario
would be a seismically generated tsunami. The tsunami
generated by the 1908 MW 7.1–7.3 earthquake and asso-
ciated submarine landslide that occurred in the Straits of
Messina had a run-up of up to 11.7 m (Tinti and Armi-
gliato 2003; Favalli et al. 2009). However, Italian Civil
Protection is preparing for a less catastrophic, but more
likely and manageable (plausible) scenario, based on his-
torical tsunamis of a local, on island or submarine flank
source, that have impacted Stromboli in the past due to
PDCs or landslides displacing the sea (Maramai et al.
2005a). The 2002 and 2019 tsunamis, respectively result-
ing from landslide and PDC entry into the sea, are thus
currently used by Civil Protection as an evacuation sce-
nario. This seems realistic for the most likely events in
need of evacuation, where other tsunamis with such trig-
gers occurred in 1916, 1919, 1930, 1944, 1954, and 1988
(Maramai et al. 2005a; Roberto et al. 2014). However,
these events either had a smaller amplitude or lack data.
The 1930 tsunami is known, though, to have had a run-
up of 2–3 m (Maramai et al. 2005a). We thus next detail
these two tsunami case types that we will use to define
the exposed area and evacuation times in our evacuation
system.
On December 28, 2002, after several months of high
levels of normal explosive activity, a flank eruption
began on the Sciara del Fuoco (Bonaccorso et al. 2003;
Calvari et al. 2005). Two days later on December 30 two
landslides occurred on the Sciara del Fuoco, the first at
13:15 (local time) and the second at 13:22. They gener-
ated two tsunamis 7 min apart, each with a maximum
run-up of 10.9 m (Tinti et al. 2006a). The first tsunami
was due, in a large part, to a submarine landslide near
the coast, which involved 20 ! 106 m3 of material
(Chiocci et al. 2003). The second tsunami was caused by
a purely sub-aerial landslide that broke off at about 500
m a.s.l and involved a volume of material of between 4
and 9 ! 106 m3 (Tinti et al. 2006b). The run-up area,
given in Fig. 1, was obtained from post-event surveys
made along the coasts of the Aeolian Islands (Maramai
et al. 2005b; Tinti et al. 2006a). According to eye-witness
testimonies the first tsunami was particularly destructive
in Ficogrande and along the Spiaggia Lunga Beach, as lo-
cated in Fig. 3 (Tinti et al., 2005). Both tsunamis were
also said to have caused light damage in Scari, also lo-
cated in Fig. 3. On Stromboli, many houses are located
along the seafront and are particularly exposed to the
tsunami hazard (Fig. 4). Following the landslides, the en-
tire coastline of the island was affected by tsunamis in
less than 4 min (Tinti et al. 2006b). The waves moved
faster in the deeper water and reached the island of
Panarea, 20 km SW of Stromboli, in just under 5 min
(Tinti et al. 2006b).
On July 3 and August 28, 2019, two paroxysms occurred
each producing an ash plume several kilometres in height
and pyroclastic flows that entered the sea (Global Volcanism
Program 2019). Seafloor pressure sensors run by the LGS
(Laboratorio Geofisica Sperimentale – Università di Firenze,
Florence, Italy) recorded a tsunami with an amplitude of 40
to 20 cm. The sensors are linked to a siren-based warning
system in the village of Stromboli and on August 28, the si-
rens were triggered manually 15 s after wave generation and
75 s after the explosion (Lacanna and Ripepe in prep). Re-
sponse by tourists, who at the time were arriving on day ex-
cursion boats from the mainland (mostly the towns of
Tropea and Messina), as well as those on the beaches, was
confused. Many ran towards the sea, away from the eruption
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but towards the eventual in-coming tsunami. At the harbour,
tourists tried to reboard the vessels they had just disem-
barked, and in the confusion, some found themselves on the
wrong boat and returned to Messina rather than Tropea.
This argues for the need for a well-stated evacuation plan
supported by clearly marked evacuation routes and safe
locations.
Method
GIS layers listed in Table 1 were already available from
the European Space Agency (ESA), LGS, and the Dipar-
timento della Protezione Civile (DPC). This included a
Digital Elevation Model (DEM), a Pleiades-1A image on
which all buildings could be identified, located and their
shapes mapped, as well as the area in need of evacuation
Fig. 3 a Zoom on Stromboli village with the delimitation of the inhabited areas (in white, the squares mapped during fieldwork). b Zoom on
Ficogrande with the local road network and location of the two main hotels: The Sirenetta Park (S) and Miramare (M), as well as building 025B (B)
described in Appendix A. Image data ©2019 Google Earth: SIO, NOAA, U. S. Navy, NGA, GEBCO
Fig. 4 Typical strombolian buildings in front of the sea. a View looking north along the sea front showing holiday homes on top of a 5 m high
lava cliff at Scalo dei Balordi. b View looking north from balcony in house at the SE end of Spiaggia Lunga towards the tsunami source. c View
looking east along the sea front at Spiaggia Lunga
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(the “red” zone) as defined by DPC based on the Decem-
ber 2002 run-up data. However, several layers, including
building exit points, open spaces, beaches, “safe” zones,
and road/path networks needed to be created. This was
done by mapping the village during a 10-day field survey
in January 2020. Prior to field work, the village area was
divided into 26 map squares to be surveyed using Goo-
gle Earth and the Pleiades imagery (Fig. 3). To assess the
tsunami hazard, areas impacted by the 2002 run-up were
focused on (i.e., mapping squares 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 10, 11, 14
and 26 in Fig. 3). During the survey, the physical charac-
teristics of each building in the targeted map squares
were recorded (Appendix A), photos were taken (Appen-
dix B), and each building was assigned a unique code.
The road network was segmented, assigned a code and
the character (surface type, state of repair, width, bottle-
necks, number of steps, presence of street furniture/
drains) described. All buildings and road segments were
mapped on hardcopy map sheets (one for each square),
and a custom designed data sheet was filled out for each
building (e.g., Appendix A). Thus, during fieldwork, 14
extra vector layers were created (Table 2) to comple-
ment those already available as listed in Table 1. Data
were integrated into a GIS where we used QGIS
(Quantum GIS) 3.10.3 with GRASS (Geographic
Resources Analysis Support System) version 7.8.2. The
projected CRS (Coordinate Reference System) used was
WGS 84 / UTM zone 33 N, as is suitable for use in the
Northern hemisphere between the equator and 84°N,
and between 12°E and 18°E (EPSG database,2019). This
GIS was set up in a five step process to allow generation
of the key product: an evacuation route map and evacu-
ation time matrix (Fig. 5).
Step 1: Evacuation area delineation
We considered two tsunami hazard scenarios triggered
locally by volcanic activity. The first scenario is a
landslide trigger, which has a sudden onset, such as the
events of 2002. The sudden and local trigger means that
there is just a 4-min travel time for the wave from the
source of the tsunami (the foot of the Sciara del Fuoco)
to Stromboli village (Fig. 1). The second scenario is entry
of pyroclastic flow into the sea during a paroxysm and
the tiltmeters on which is based the actual warning sys-
tem gives a 3–4-min tsunami travel time. We thus
needed to define three zones using the polygon vector
layers of the DEM (Fig. 5a): a four-minute evacuation
zone; a margin of error zone, and a “safe” zone. Because
each zone is delineated by an altitude level, to construct
these areas it was first necessary to extract the contours
from the DTM, where a step of 5 m between each curve
was used based on the 10.9 m run-up of 2002 (Tinti
et al. 2006a) plus 5 m of associated uncertainty (Leone
et al. 2018). The red zone represents the area to be evac-
uated in the case of a December 2002-type event for
which we have 4 min of warning. This zone corresponds
to the area impacted by the 2002 tsunami and roughly
follows the 10m contour. The yellow zone is the pos-
sible error margin and is located between the red zone
and the 15 m contour. The green zone is the “safe” zone
and starts above the 15m contour.
Step 2: High-stakes areas
A high-stakes area was defined as including all buildings
of the red zone. These were analysed in detail because of
their high exposure in the case of future tsunami. To do
this, a field survey sheet was designed to assess the ease
of escape from a room, building or property including
location and size of windows and doors by storey, ease
of roof access, presence of shutters and type, and pres-
ence of gates and steps (Appendix A). Building evacu-
ation exits were categorised as single door, which can
accommodate one person at a time and double door
which can take two people at a time (cf. Daamen and
Table 1 Existing GIS layers from ESA, LGS and DPC
Objects Data creation dates
Pleiades-1A image June 14, 2019 (0.5 m resolution)
Digital Elevation Model (DEM), Digital Surface Model (DSM), Digital Terrain
Model (DTM)
DEM: September 2017; DSM: February 2014;
DTM: January 2014
Area impacted by the 2002 tsunami, Operational centres, Sirens, 400 m
contour line, Helicopter landing pad, Waiting areas, Streets, Evacuation
routes
Area impacted by the 2002 tsunami: August 2010; Operational centres:
June 2014; Sirens: February 2003; 400 m contour line: July 2006;
Helicopter landing pads: February 2014; Waiting areas: April 2010;
Streets: July 2010; Evacuation routes: July 2010
Table 2 Data layers created on QGIS. RAEP is Refuge Area Entry Point
Layers Objects
Polygon vector layers Buildings, Open spaces, Beaches, Green zone, Yellow zone, People-Populated starting grid
Line vector layers Road network, Contour lines of 10 m, 15m, and 20m
Points vectors layers RAEP, Escape route panels, Waiting area panels, Tsunami hazard panels
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Hoogendoorn 2010; Jo et al. 2014). The use of ground
floor windows can be considered as a last resort for
evacuation, where we distinguished between very small
windows (that cannot be used), single windows (one per-
son) and double windows (two people). The height of
building enclosure walls was also recorded to determine
if it was possible to climb over it and evacuate more
quickly. An example of a completed survey is given in
Appendix A. Survey sheets were completed for all 123
buildings in the red zone and archived for future update.
Open spaces in the high-stakes area were also mapped,
as such open spaces will contain many movable
(unanchored) objects such as boats, containers or build-
ing material. In the event of a tsunami, such objects can
be picked up by the tsunami to become projectiles
capable of inflicting further damage on buildings and
shelters. They also represent an additional hazard, as
well as obstacle, to the population during an evacuation.
All data collected for buildings and open spaces, includ-
ing beach areas, were then entered into QGIS as polygon
vector layers with the DEM as the base layer (Fig. 5b).
Step 3: Road network construction
The road and path network must be well mapped and
described to implement the most accurate evacuation
time calculations as possible. This is especially important
given our four-minute evacuation time. Thus, during
field work the roads were separated into segments de-
fined by surface type, minimum width and state of repair
(pot holes, open drains, collapsed walls), as well as the
presence of obstacles (such as concrete bollards and
lamp posts) and gates (including whether they were
locked or not, private or public). The vector layer of the
road network was then created with a series of polylines
(Fig. 5c). A road network must be a single segment, thus
the individual road segments had to be properly linked
to each other using the attachment tool of QGIS. A lack
of attachment in any one place will prevent the passage
of evacuees to the safe area in the simulation. To ensure
a perfectly united network, we used the network pro-
vided by Open Street Map plugin on QGIS and added
the missing segments.
A tsunami evacuation commonly involves a positive
change in elevation. It is, therefore, also necessary to es-
timate evacuation speed according to the slope of the
terrain (Péroche 2016). Indeed, a steeper slope will re-
duce evacuation speed and more time will be needed to
reach the green (“safe”) zone. To do this, slope values
were extracted from the DTM (Fig. 5d) using the GDAL
(Geospatial Data Abstraction Library) tool in the
Toolbox of QGIS. Slope values were then reclassified
using the “r.reclass” tool of the GRASS software inte-
grated into QGIS. Following the 10 slope-dependant
evacuation velocity classes and weightings of Péroche
(2016), 10 slope classes were defined (Table 3).
Once the slopes were classified, the “statistical” tool of
QGIS was used to calculate the average slope value for
each road section. The average speed adopted by evac-
uees is referred to as the “constrained average speed” be-
cause it is influenced by the imminence of danger
(Péroche 2016). That is, it is faster than normal as the
evacuee is aware of the danger and the need to evacuate.
However, the speed will still vary according to the class
of slope and the nature of the road section (Table 3).
Fig. 5 a Extraction steps of contour lines and creation of different zones. b Creation steps for building, open space, and beach zone data. c
Creation steps for the road network. d Extraction of slopes. e Creation steps of the populated starting grid. Blue = initial data, Yellow = data
processing steps, and Green = generated “data” layer (modified from Leone et al. 2018)
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Thus, road sections were classified into three categories
according to their nature: a first class includes two-lane
roads, a second class includes single-lane roads, and a
last class includes narrow passageways, alleys, paths,
stairs, and tracks/trails. Each section type was then
assigned a speed reduction coefficient (Table 3). Evacu-
ation time calibration was carried out by us at Fico-
grande (Fig. 3) by walking and running from starting
points in the red zone to safe zones, where evacuations
were guided (i.e., the evacuation route was known) and
unguided (i.e., the route was not known). These were
used to compare with our simulated routes and times.
Step 4: Number of evacuees (network load)
To assess the load on the evacuation network in terms
of congestion, the likely number of escapees needs to be
assessed. Two types of evacuation scenario were consid-
ered for the red zone: an individual evacuation of each
building and a large-scale evacuation of tourist gathering
places (hotels, beaches, sea front restaurants, bars, and
shops). To test a mass evacuation, a populated starting
grid must be created in the form of a polygon-type vec-
tor layer. To do this, we found that a square grid with
10m cell sizes with a coverage corresponding to the red
zone was optimal (Fig. 5e). For each square in the grid, a
population density now needs to be estimated. This was
achieved through holiday apartment rental ads and hotel
capacities as advertised on the Internet (room capacities
for hotels can, for example, be obtained from booking
websites). If such information was not available, we used
a density of one person per 20 m2, a value calculated
from the Internet-derived data. For the beach, the dens-
ity was estimated by head counts from 85 photos be-
tween 2012 and 2019 available on Google Images.
For each population grid square, a centroid is auto-
matically created with the “centroids” tool of QGIS.
These centroids represent the starting points of each
evacuation and contain the density information of the
populated starting grid. Some of these centroids had to
be moved to correspond to the exit of a building. All
centroids must be attached to the road network using
the attachment tool. After the 2002 tsunami, road signs
were installed to inform or to indicate evacuation routes
(Fig. 2). Three sign layers were thus also created in the
GIS: tsunami hazard information panels, “escape route”
arrows, and waiting area signs (Table 2). To reach the
green zone, evacuees must pass through a Refuge Area
Entry Point (RAEP). RAEPs are present at the intersec-
tion of the road network and the 20 m contour line, i.e.,
the entry of the evacuation route into the green zone.
Following Leone et al. (2018) the entrance into the ref-
uge zone was thus shifted 5 m in height into the green
zone to prevent evacuees from stopping exactly at the
boundary between the safe zone and the danger zone to
present a bottle neck (cf. Ma et al. 2014).
Step 5: Evacuation simulation calibration
Evacuation time calculations were made from all depart-
ure points, the centroids, to all red zone evacuation
exits, the RAEPs. These simulations in QGIS are carried
out with the QNEAT3 plugin (Médard and Foulquier in
prep). The simulations need: (i) a road network (polyline
vector layer), (ii) a populated starting grid (polygon vec-
tor layer), (iii) origin points (polygon centroid vector
layer), (iv) destination points (point vector layer), and (v)
a map background (raster layer). As part of the simula-
tion, first, the road network is fragmented into segments
with the “explode line” tool. Then, the “OD Matrix from
Layers as Table (m:n)” tool of QNEAT3 is used to calcu-
late the cost of each displacement on the road network
from point A to point B. The cost is defined as the re-
quired travel time to reach safety. Our focus is on the
Table 3 Pedestrian evacuation speeds adopted and weightings (translated and modified from Péroche 2016)
Speeds after application of reduction coefficient (km/h)
Class Slope value (%) Associated speed
(km/h)
Two-lane road Single-lane road Passageway, path, stairs, unsurfaced track
Reduction coefficient 1 0.8 0.5
1 < 3 4.85 4.85 3.88 2.43
2 [3–6[ 4.55 4.55 3.64 2.28
3 [6–9[ 4.26 4.26 3.41 2.13
4 [9–12[ 3.97 3.97 3.18 1.99
5 [12–15[ 3.69 3.69 2.95 1.85
6 [15–18[ 3.42 3.42 2.74 1.71
7 [18–21[ 3.15 3.15 2.52 1.58
8 [21–24[ 2.90 2.90 2.32 1.45
9 [24–27[ 2.65 2.65 2.12 1.33
10 ! 27 1.71 1.71 1.37 0.86
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fastest times, so we used the fastest path criterion. The
speed criteria defined as part of step 3 are inserted into
the calculations as a velocity field and, because each road
section has a speed value, the default speed does not
need to be considered.
The result of the costing algorithm can be extracted
using “DB Manager” in QGIS. In this way, the fastest
travel times can be selected and saved as a new layer.
Once the “fastest destination” layer has been created, the
“Join attributes by field value” and the “Join by lines
(hub lines)” tool allows generation of the paths between
the departure points and the arrival points. However,
these paths are “as the crow flies” and do not consider
the road network. To modify the path, the “shortest path
(layer to point)” tool makes it possible to draw paths as
a function of the existing road network from the starting
points layer to a RAEP. This adjustment is intended for
a single, specific RAEP. Because we need to calculate the
shortest evacuation times by considering all possible
RAEPs, and so as to obtain a view of all the fastest paths,
the Python console is instead set-up for all starting
points and all arrival points. This Python script is avail-
able in the QNEAT3 tutorial (Médard and Foulquier in
prep), where some small modifications must be made to
the script, especially relating to the differences in the
names of the layers used. Once the script is complete,
each evacuation route is created in an individual layer
named “Shortest Path Layer”. This layer needs to be
merged with all other shortest path layers with the
“Merge vector layers” tool in QGIS to obtain a single
layer with all the fastest evacuation routes.
Interviews and fieldwork timing
On-site, semi-structured interviews were conducted with
residents. We sought to find out their experiences,
needs, expectations, and reactions (positive or negative)
to a tsunami on Stromboli. The interviews also allowed
us to verify the limits of the 2002 inundation zone
through eye-witness testimony. The field study was car-
ried out at the end of January 2020, which is an ex-
tremely low tourist season. However, this had four
advantages. First, the vast majority of buildings were un-
occupied and therefore easy to access, with the popula-
tion knowing that we were entering properties to
complete a survey. Second, the population was “relaxed”
(not preoccupied and stressed by the busy tourist sea-
son) and were thus able to help, actively supporting the
project and devoting time to interviews. This was helped
by a feeling that we were carrying out work to help
them. Third, plans could be tailored to individual needs,
especially for those living and working in the red zone.
Fourth, we could get a good feel for the day and night
use and permanent resident population density of the
red zone, allowing us to design a plan useful for the
permanent population who, given that they are always
on the island, are the most exposed.
Results
Because our initial objective is to set-up, fine tune and
test the methodology, we focused on a single control
zone which contained all key elements of the evacuation
scenario, and which is representative of the GIS content
for the entire risk zone. For this, the area around the
Ficogrande beach was chosen (Fig. 3). This area was par-
ticularly severely affected by the December 2002 tsu-
nami, where water and entrained debris reached a height
of 10 m along this stretch of coast causing heavy mater-
ial damage to buildings (Tinti et al. 2006a). The topog-
raphy is also extremely impractical in terms of
evacuation, where a flat zone just 5 m wide is backed by
a 12m high cliff represented by a lava flow front, that of
the San Bartolo unit emplaced during Stromboli’s last
flank eruption 5 ka (Calvari et al. 2011). Because most of
the village is underlain by such units (Calvari et al.
2011), such a topographic configuration is common
along this coastline. This means that evacuation is either
up a steep hill (or a flight of steps that ascend the flow
front), or involves following the coast road so that
evacuation is parallel to the shore for some distance.
Fortunately, the 2002 tsunami took place in December,
so the area was particularly empty.
Our January 2020 survey showed none of the buildings
in the Ficogrande sector to be occupied during the win-
ter, and a maximum daytime transient population of be-
tween one and three (this being workers maintaining the
sea-front hotel gardens, fishermen on the jetty to the
south of the area, or people passing through the sector
on the coast road by bike or Ape—a small three wheeled
moped-truck suitable for transport of freight through
the narrow alleyways of Stromboli village). However, in
the summer, the many holiday rentals and two hotels
that characterize the land use of this zone are open, and
by day the seaside restaurants are also open and full.
Ficogrande also represents a popular tourist beach, and
during any summer night the density estimate based on
rental ads on the Internet shows that 400–500 people
can be accommodated in this area.
All three hazard areas occupy this sector: red, yellow,
and green (Fig. 6). Of these, the red zone represents the
area that needs to be evacuated within 4 min in the case
of a December 2002-type tsunami event. It contains 31
holiday rental buildings and two hotels. The yellow zone
is the 5 m high margin of error zone to be considered
during an evacuation; and the green zone, above the 15
m contour line, corresponds to the safety zone. Note
that the yellow zone is sometimes absent from the study
area due to the presence of the cliff: the red zone
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extends to the base of the cliff, and the green zone
begins on the top of it.
Evacuation times
Fig. 7 shows all possible evacuation routes from all
possible starting points within the Ficogrande sector. In
addition to the building exits, evacuation routes and
exits from the beach needed to be defined. On the
beach, five exits are present. However, some are not ac-
cessible due to either their poor state of repair or ero-
sion of sand due to the 23 December 2019 storm that
left the exit points hanging 1 m above the beach level.
As of January 2020, only the two exits at the north end
of the beach were, thus, usable. However, paths on the
beach were traced to join each of the five exits. The
starting points of the tests for each evacuation are
depicted by the red centroids within the populated start
grid and the arrival points by the entry points (RAEP) to
the refuge areas (Fig. 7).
We can now use this network to estimate evacuation
time and optimal evacuation route (Fig. 8). Evacuation
time calculations only consider the speeds registered for
the road network. They do not include time needed to
exit the building, and there is no reaction time factor or
consideration of congestion phenomena, as these cannot
be included using the QNEAT3 plugin. The test results
show that the fastest evacuation route involves following
Via Marina either west or east to the central stairway
(Fig. 8). Consequently, 79 departure points are evacuated
to RAEP13, 14 to RAEP14, and just one to RAEP12.
This means that more than three-quarters of the people
in this sector (potentially 300–375 individuals) will
evacuate to the same point using the same narrow stair-
case that feeds RAEP13 (Fig. 9). The distribution of indi-
viduals between the different Refuge Area Entry Points
Fig. 6 Hazard areas in Ficogrande
Fig. 7 Evacuation routes from all starting centroids
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is therefore not homogenous and will create a much
larger group of people at RAEP13 and may thus be
flagged as a potential bottle neck (cf. Ma et al. 2014).
Figure 8 shows that the nearest RAEP in terms of dis-
tance is not always the one that is reached most quickly,
as can be seen with departure points 73, 74, 80 and 85
in the northeast corner of the map. These points need to
be evacuated in the direction of danger (towards and
along the coast) and then up the staircase of Via
Nunziante to RAEP13 instead of up the first inland road
encountered (to RAEP 14). Evacuation times of the
whole Ficogrande sector are highly variable (Table 4),
ranging from 47 s (Point 41) to 7 min and 6 s (Point 94).
A landslide-generated tsunami from the foot of the
Sciara del Fuoco will arrive in Ficogrande in less than 4
min after the siren alert. We see here that of the 94 de-
parture points, 73 can be evacuated (i.e., 67 points di-
vided between 31 buildings, plus six points on the
beach) in less than 4 min (Table 4, green points on
Fig. 8). This means that 21 points are non-evacuable
(i.e., 7 points divided between four buildings, plus 14
points on the beach) in 4 min (red points on Fig. 8).
Once set up for Ficogrande, the same type of evacuation
maps with evacuable and non-evacuable points could
also be produced for all other red zone regions, the GIS
allowing ease of map generation and update. The
Fig. 8 Evaluation of the possibility of evacuating in less than 4 min in Ficogrande
Fig. 9 Main access to Ficogrande: Via Nunziante. a From the beach going up to the RAEP13. b From the RAEP13 down towards the beach
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resulting evacuation maps for of Piscità, Punta Lena and
Scari are given in Appendices C, D and E, respectively.
Individual building evacuation plans
During the fieldwork, all buildings in the red zone
were surveyed, which involved a total of 35 buildings
in the Ficogrande sector. A completed example of a
building survey is available in Appendix A, this be-
ing for building 025B (Fig. 3). We see that building
025B has two large double doors on the ground
floor that open directly onto the sea front road that
can be accessed by passage over a low wall, making
it possible to quickly evacuate the inhabitants of the
ground floor (Appendix B). However, evacuation
from the first floor involves use of a single door, a
gate and descent of a flight of about 20 steps to ac-
cess the evacuation road (Appendix B). Evacuate
from the back of the building is not possible due to
the presence of the cliff behind the building, and
taking refuge on the roof will not be a solution as
the roof level remains below 10 m and thus might be
inundated by the tsunami. However, in cases where
the roof height attains the 10 m level (corresponding
to the first or second floor roof depending on the
location), roof form could be used as a last resort
option for a vertical evacuation shelter. We thus
generated maps identifying such possible shelter op-
tions (Fig. 10).
We used these detailed building surveys and plans
to tailor individual evacuation plans for every room of
every building in the red zone, where an example is
given in Fig. 11. In designing these maps, we follow
standard role, design and symbol usage for fire
evacuation maps as posted to room doors in hotels
(cf. Kobes et al. 2010; Wang et al. 2014). The aim is
to make the maps not seem shocking, but instead to
deal with an event that may happen and for which
we need to be prepared, as is the same for aircraft or
passenger boat style evacuation plans. The example of
Fig. 11 is relatively simple, but more complex plans
can be produced for larger buildings (containing mul-
tiple apartments) and hotels, as in the example of
Fig. 12. In such cases, the numerous rooms, corridors,
staircases and exits mean that each room/door needs
an individual plan with a single line leading to the
nearest evacuation exit. Again, such a plan format is
familiar to any hotel guest and are intended to be ac-
ceptable for use by hotels who wish to protect their
clients while not inducing unnecessary fear or driving
away clients. All the same, individual plans were




The position of the red, yellow, and green layer bound-
aries was set following established guidelines for the haz-
ard zone limits, as defined following the tsunami events
that have occurred at Stromboli since December 2002.
In some cases, we adjusted the limit of the red zone,
moving it inland, if an eye-witness told us of flooding
beyond the limit of our initially defined boundary. How-
ever, depending on the case in hand, these boundaries
are likely to vary significantly (Leone et al. 2012; Péroche
2016). For Stromboli, a landslide of volume greater than
that of 30 December 2002, which was 17–20 ! 106 m3
Table 4 Evacuation times in minutes from each evacuation point on Fig. 8, except for Via Sole which is marked on Fig. 3
Numerical tests
ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Time (min) 3!32 3!39 3!17 3!35 3!38 3!22 3!04 3!22 3!15 2!55 3!00 3!00 3!18 3!12 2!58 2!35 4!37 4!22 3!37 2!11
ID 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
Time (min) 2!09 2!40 2!43 1!57 3!31 2!46 2!37 1!38 3!09 2!26 1!48 1!13 2!24 1!12 4!26 2!03 2!17 1!06 2!13 1!20
ID 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
Time (min) 0!47 3!45 2!21 1!33 2!22 3!25 2!10 1!50 2!06 2!50 2!04 1!57 4!49 2!47 2!58 3!22 3!24 3!37 4!23 3!08
ID 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
Time (min) 3!58 4!00 4!56 3!13 3!42 3!46 5!44 4!05 3!34 4!57 4!29 3!50 3!58 4!26 4!24 3!26 3!56 2!24 1!57 4!22
ID 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
Time (min) 3!18 4!01 2!01 2!00 4!34 3!03 2!45 5!43 4!28 3!03 4!01 3!567!02 7’06
Field tests of January 2020
Towards RAEP11 (Via Sole) Towards RAEP13 Towards RAEP14
ID 11 17 11 17 51 52 71 89 94 89
Time (min) 3!17 3!51 1!48 2!22 1!30 0!56 2!55 4!00 4!59 2!30
In bold are the times longer than 4 min
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for the first tsunami (Chiocci et al. 2003) and produced
a wave with an amplitude of 10.9 m (Tinti et al. 2006a),
could produce a larger wave. In our case, the priority
area for evacuation was estimated using the 2002 sce-
nario based on literature sources. The 2002 tsunami was
the largest recorded tsunami of the last century and has
been particularly well-studied in terms of its generation,
dynamics, and characteristics (Chiocci et al. 2008).
However, addition of the yellow zone allows for the con-
sideration of a potentially larger event.
Resident interviews
Five useful points came out of our resident interviews.
First, due to the tourist based economy, sites once well-
known for being at-risk from tsunami, and thus not used
for residence, are now used as residences, holiday rental
Fig. 11 Personalised evacuation plan for building 025B
Fig. 10 Consideration of vertical evacuation
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and tourist facilities. Indeed, prior to the 1970’s coastal
areas were just used for warehouses, and fisherman
commuted to the coastal zone (known to be a high risk
area for tsunami) from their residences higher in the vil-
lage. Second, there are six buildings occupied all year
round at Punta Lena (Fig. 3), making this a very-high-
risk zone. Residents are aware that they are in a high-
risk zone and know the need to move inland in the event
of a tsunami. However, some are fatalistic in that they
know they only have 4 min and know that this is not
enough time to save themselves. One resident did,
though, say they would climb onto the roof instead,
highlighting the need for, and value of, vertical evacu-
ation (cf. Figure 10). Third, some residents were aware
that (i) they are too far from the siren to hear it well,
and (ii) if they are asleep at the time of the alert may not
hear it at-all, highlighting the need to a personalized
(app-based) alert. As a result, each evacuation route (i.e.,
evacuation routes from every point to every evacuation
exit) were prepared as individual KMZ files for use in
Google Earth or customized apps that trigger distribu-
tion of the best evacuation route based on phone loca-
tion (e.g., Appendix F). Fourth, residents are not
necessarily able to move their place of residence out of
the red zone, even if they want to, as they are committed
to staying in the house where they are due to financial
or personal reasons, so that relocation of particularly ex-
posed buildings is not an option. Fifth, interviewees were
often told by their parents of the sound that the tsunami
made, which was a major memory. This was a rumbling
sound due to the entrainment of boulders and was a
sound at which locals would immediately self-evacuate,
and their descendants (through verbal history) knew to
do the same. This last point is emphasized in the local
memories collated by Famularo (2013) who states that
fishermen in the past knew that, if there was a paroxysm,
they should head off shore as quickly as possible to avoid
the resulting tsunami. Our maps then provide a guide as
to the optimal route to follow and shelter point to seek.
Projectiles and population densities
The main variable that we could not assess was the pres-
ence of unanchored seasonal street furniture such as
stalls, beach umbrellas, deck chairs/sunbeds, advertising
panels/wooden signs, surf boards, canoes, plastic/
wooden beach walkways, and bar tables/chairs. There
will also be an increased incidence of the number of bi-
cycles, Ape, and Vespa in the summer. In the event of a
tsunami, these objects will all be picked up, or rolled
along, to act as projectiles to cause further structural
damage and severe-to-fatal physical injury (Watcharong
et al. 2005). The presence, quantity, and distribution of
such items, added to the boulders and beach pebbles,
will enhance the risk posed by a summer tsunami in a
touristic area.
It is also difficult to estimate the population density
conditions for an evacuation in the summer period. For
some buildings, a reliable estimate of the number of resi-
dents in the summer can be made by looking up bed-
room capacities available at on-line booking sites. In the
winter, we were able to identify inhabited properties in
the red zone and interview all residents (with two
Fig. 12 Personalised evacuation plan for building 013C
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exceptions). Generally, the interviewees also gave infor-
mation on the summer-use of any neighbouring proper-
ties and the number of summer inhabitants, even the
period of occupation. However, this information was
rare, and, for the summer scenario, a population esti-
mate based on floor space is the only possible solution.
Regarding the estimation for the number of beach users,
in winter the beaches, generally, are completely empty.
The exception are afternoon fishermen (between one
and three) who fish off of the Molo (Jetty) at the East-
end of the Ficogrande beach (Fig. 8), residents taking ex-
ercise (one or two, either walking or on bicycles), work-
men carrying out winter maintenance (one or two) and
traffic using the Via Marina (Fig. 3). The total popula-
tion at any one time was never greater than five, and
there were no inhabited buildings in this sector. The
total for the summer was estimated by counting the
number of beach users on 85 photos found on the inter-
net, considering several summers between 2012 and
2019. We obtained 80–100 people at Ficogrande, 20–25
at Scalo dei Balordi, 40–50 at Spiaggia Lunga, and 250–
300 at Scari (see Fig. 3 for beach locations).
Evacuation time results: caveats and considerations
The results of the evacuation modelling tested on the
Ficogrande sector show that most of the departure
points are evacuated to RAEP13 located above a flight of
steps the links the beach road to this point (cf Fig. 9),
and that most points can be evacuated within 4 min.
However, these times do not consider the possible con-
gestion. The QNEAT3 plugin does not also consider the
behaviour of individuals such as reaction time, social in-
teractions, and retrieving belongings (Kelman et al.
2008), nor the slower speed of swimmers leaving the sea
or the slower progress of evacuees on the beach due to
sand, rocks and lack of footwear. Neither does it take
into account the education state of the crowd, the size
and design of doors, bottle necks and other problems,
such as blockage by slower moving individuals (Ma et al.
2014). Our model must thus be viewed as fastest pos-
sible evacuation times, under optimum traffic and reac-
tion conditions. To obtain times that are more
representative of a congested scenario, multi-agent
simulation micro-scale models (MAS) such as SimWalk
could be used (Sahal 2011; Morin 2012; Sahal et al.
2013; Péroche 2016). These models take into account
the physical and behavioural characteristics of individ-
uals (Sahal et al. 2013; Péroche 2016). However, such
models are complex, computationally heavy and suited
for well-constrained, scenarios of limited size, such as
evacuation from individual buildings, cruise ships or
shopping centres, or even through single doors or tun-
nels (Lämmel et al. 2010; Wang et al. 2014). Our object-
ive is to produce a map of “best option” (quickest)
evacuation routes, and to identify locations in need of
the most time for evacuation, for all points across an en-
tire village sector. In our case the village sector to be
evacuated is 2.7 km long and with an area of 0.18 km2,
contains 123 individual buildings and 534 doors, and po-
tentially hosts thousands of people. Any one of these
building-door-agent combinations could be the focus of
a micro-model-based study and is thus not our
objective.
However, our large-scale modelling can allow identifi-
cation of potential improvements to the evacuation net-
work and to make recommendations on the placement
of signage and vertical evacuation structures. In the case
of RAEP13, for example, it points to the possible need to
relieve the load on the Via Nunziante stairs and, thus,
RAEP13 by redirecting to RAEP12. The redesigned plan
is given in Fig. 13. Our methodology allows us to pro-
duce three levels of evacuation map. The first level is
zonal, and shows all evacuations from all points to all
RAEP in any given village zone (Fig. 13a). The second
level is for individual RAEP and focuses on all evacu-
ation routes ending at any given RAEP where, to aid in
clarity, on the doors linked to that RAEP are mapped
(Fig. 13b). The third level is for each individual door
with, again, no other door marked so as to maximise
clarity (Fig. 13c). In Appendix G we also show an ex-
ample for a beach exit evacuation point. In total we pro-
duced four level 1 maps, 23 level 2 maps and 316 level 3
maps, where all level 1 maps are given in Appendices C,
D, E and Fig. 8.
Exit signs in hotels/buildings, as well as DPC signage,
should then be set up to direct the evacuation flow ac-
cordingly (Bertolaso et al. 2009). This may involve a re-
think of signage, as the only exit signs inside hotels are
for the case of fire and tend to direct guests to the re-
ception desk which in the case considered here is lo-
cated on the sea front. Adding specific exit signs and
evacuation plans directing guests out of the hotel and to
the nearest RAEP (Fig. 7) would facilitate and ensure
better evacuation in the case of a tsunami. This ad-
dresses the idea that for short fuse events (such as that
considered here), there is little time for people to edu-
cate themselves. People unfamiliar with the area will
look to follow the behaviour of others. Consequently,
and in areas with visitor populations, it is useful to de-
velop educational and training programs for the visitor
industry (e.g., Johnston et al. 2007; Johnston et al. 2016;
Blake et al. 2018).
No matter which solution is chosen, it is impossible to
evacuate all of the Ficogrande sector completely in the
time allotted (i.e., 4 min). At least 7 min and 6 s are ne-
cessary to evacuate this area in the absence of conges-
tion and bottle necking. This value does not take into
account the reaction time to the siren which could vary
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between no time for highly aware individuals to several
minutes for individuals with no awareness or in a situ-
ation which means reaction is compromised (e.g., people
sleeping, parents with children, individuals with disabilities).
For these cases, we arbitrarily add 3 min to the evacu-
ation time, so that the minimum warning time
needed to evacuate the entire zone is 10 min (Appen-
dix H). The 10-min of extra time would also allow us
to optimise the evacuation plan to better distribute
pedestrian capacity across the three evacuation exits
(RAEP) from this sector. Thus, we point to the value
of such mapping in guiding tolerable thresholds for
warning times. In the case where only a four-minute
warning is possible, vertical evacuation towers with
sufficient capacity needs to be an option (Park et al.
2012; Ashar et al. 2014), where our methodology can
also point to suitable roof-top options. Our building
surveys, for example, showed that all roofs were flat,
Fig. 13 Modification of evacuation routes to improve traffic flow for Ficogrande. a Evacuation of all the centroids in the Ficogrande zone. b
Specific evacuation of the centroids to the RAEP13. c Individual evacuation of 57 centroid to the RAEP13
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strong, and suitable for vertical evacuation, and
allowed us to define those which had two storeys and
an adequate roof to serve as a vertical evacuation
point in case of last resort (Fig. 10). However, this
needs to be considered only as a last resort option
due to the chance of building failure (Nakano 2010)
and the possibility of the tsunami overtopping the
building height.
Our evacuation time tests of Table 4 are generally twice
as fast as those obtained by the model. For example, mod-
elled evacuation time from point 11 (Fig. 8) is 3min,
whereas we achieved an evacuation in 1min and 48 s. Thus,
individual evacuations could be quicker. This, however, is
because we ran and not all individuals may have the same
capacity. We note though, that the survey of Gregg et al.
(2006) of survivors of the 2004 Sumatra tsunami found that
most respondents did indeed run “as fast as they could” but
could not identify a safe place. This was also a problem
with our tests. The first tests from points 11 and 17 (Fig. 8)
were unguided. The quickest evacuation route up Via Nun-
ziante was not obvious, so evacuees ran up Via Regina
Elena to evacuate the beach to the west, eventually finding
the Via Sole RAEP (RAEP 11, Fig. 13a) after between 3 and
4min (Table 4), in spite of running as fast as they could.
This further points to the value of carefully calibrated
evacuation plans.
Conclusion
We here develop, test, and apply a method to assess the
quickest evacuation routes from high-risk, populated,
coastal zones exposed to tsunami ingress. The method
allows the time, and route, of evacuation from every
door or beach access gate in an exposed zone to the
nearest (by time) exit point from the high-risk area. Key
layers to the GIS, after definition of the exposed area
(the red zone) and the safe area (the green zone) –
which are based on land inundated during historic tsu-
namis, is door location (in all mapped buildings) and
quality of the road/path network. This can only be
assessed by field mapping, during which the population
can also be interviewed so that their level of awareness
regarding the hazard can be assessed. This field observa-
tion approach also has the advantage of identifying those
most exposed to the hazard, i.e., those living perman-
ently in, or regular visitors to, the red zone and their
needs (in terms of evacuation plans).
For the Stromboli case tested here, we find that build-
ing design is amenable to quick evacuation, where of the
123 buildings identified in the red zone there were 534
doors, for an average of around 4 doors per building. In
addition, roofs were flat, strong, and easy to access mak-
ing them a last resort vertical evacuation option in case
of the need of immediate evacuation. For horizontal
evacuation, we focused on the popular beach of
Ficogrande behind which there are two hotels with a
total summer night capacity of 141. For this area, 31 of
the 35 buildings could be evacuated within the 4-min
threshold. For complete evacuation, our simulations
show that a minimum of 10min of warning is required.
Such a warning time would also allow a more evenly dis-
tributed use of evacuation routes so that any single route
does not suffer from congestion or bottle necking ef-
fects. If such a warning time is not possible, our maps
also allow the location and capacity of vertical evacu-
ation shelters to be assessed, and best routes to them to
be defined.
The tragic loss among residents and tourists during
the tsunamis generated by the 26 December 2004 Aceh
earthquake grimly demonstrated the potential for disaster
when waves inundate coastlines where sea-front tourist fa-
cilities are well-developed (Kelman et al. 2008). Our meth-
odology being applicable to a large spatial scale involving
thousands of agents, could be used for any population ex-
posed to tsunami. This applies especially to communities
within minutes of the potential tsunami source, as is the
case on small volcano islands such as Stromboli, and the
other Aeolian Islands with coastal tourist development.
Output maps can be used directly as individual evacuation
plans tailored to each exposed point, but can also be used
to guide signage placement and other mitigation efforts,
as well as set up of minimum warning times and alerting
thresholds and protocols.
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